Introduction
Over an extended period of time, a typical firm reports its quarterly earnings; then analysts forecast the next quarter's earnings; then the firm reports earnings for that quarter; followed by further analyst forecasts …. -we observe an 'earnings/forecasts' cycle. Our central research question asks: what is the role played by financial analysts in informing the market of the performance of a firm via earnings forecasts and what are the dynamic interactions between earnings forecasts and firms' reported earnings in both the short-run and the long-run? Although our basic question is not new, the approach that we take is novel and the insight this offers is important.
The accumulated evidence that analysts provide a valuable service to investors, typically centres on the market price reactions to firm earnings announcements and analysts forecasts (see Frankel, Kothari and Weber, 2006; Lennox and Park, 2006; Asquith, Mikhail and Au, 2005; Gleason and Lee, 2003; Bartov et al., 2002; Skinner and Sloan, 2002; Lopez and Rees, 2001; Francis and Soffer, 1997; Lang and Lundholm, 1996) . However, it is recognized that the pooled cross-sectional approach and use of market reactions to support the information value of various competing sources of information (viz. analyst and firm earnings announcements) is dependent on a range of methodological choices -for example, the length of the event window used and the fact that tests jointly examine market efficiency and the model used. The interpretation of these results is therefore open to debate and subject to a wide variety of interpretations. 1 1 Notably, the post-earnings announcement drift evidence has been used to cast doubt on the efficiency with which the market responds to earnings news (see Bartov, Radhakrishnan and Krinsky, 2000; Ball and Bartov, 1996; Bhushan, 1994 and Bernard and Thomas, 1989 , 1990 . Also, a price drift similar to that observed for earnings announcements has been documented for analyst forecast revision announcements (see Gleason and Lee, 2003; Elgars, Lo and Pfeiffer, 2001 and Brennan, Jegadeesh and Swaminanthan, 1993) . Our purpose in highlighting this area is to show that the issue of how earnings related information is disseminated and the market's response to it, is still not fully resolved.
Our paper explicitly models the (joint) dynamic characteristics of forecasts and earnings, seeking to establish whether the information contained in analyst forecasts is leading, contemporaneous or lagging a firm's public earnings announcement ('reported' earnings) . We use an adaptation of standard Granger causality tests to achieve this aim.
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Our application of this time series econometric procedure provides an alternative approach to the techniques that have been used in the extant literature, and offers new insights into the literature on the interaction between earnings and forecasts for the following reasons. First, our choice of a time-series framework affords us the unique opportunity to explore the temporal dimension of the earnings/forecasts interplay.
Second, our analysis is conducted on a firm by firm basis, and therefore allows for firm specific differences in the evolution of earnings and forecasts. Third, we are careful to pursue our research objective without reference to stock price reactions. As such, our research method has the advantage of removing possible confounding effects that might have adversely influenced the conclusions drawn by previous studies: for example, the arbitrary choice of a returns window; the unknown degree of market efficiency/inefficiency; or the likely preferential treatment of some clients by analysts leading to information leakages. Finally, we differ from the prior literature because our focus is not on the short-run value relevance of information, but rather on whether or not information from different sources (i.e. from analysts or from reports) actually adds to existing information set on earnings.
A large body of literature has established the value relevance of earnings forecasts (see Frankel, Kothari and Weber, 2006; Asquith, Mikhail and Au, 2005 ; Gleason and 2 A standard Granger causality methodology cannot be used because the analysts' forecasts are irregularly spaced and the actual earnings announcements are not always precisely one quarter apart in calendar time.
In addition, there are many analyst forecasts for each earnings announcement. Lee, 2003; Francis and Soffer, 1997; Lang and Lundholm, 1996) . For example, Bartov et al., (2002) and Lopez and Rees (2001) have shown that the prices of securities are affected by analysts' forecasts. That is, firms with positive forecast errors (firms' actual earnings are greater than analysts' forecasts), on average, tend to experience positive stock price adjustments and vice versa.
In addition, there has been empirical evidence to suggest that the interaction between analyst forecasts and firm reported earnings is dynamic and complex. Lennox and Park (2006) , Hutton (2005) , Richardson, Teoh and Wysocki (2004) and Matsumoto (2002) provide evidence on the "earnings guidance" to analysts by management. 3 Specifically, management guide the analysts to certain earnings levels that avoid negative earnings surprises and this suggests that while analysts' revision announcements may preempt "public" earnings announcements, it does not necessarily mean that the analyst information is a substitute for earnings information. Earnings reports have intrinsic value because they provide an accountability function, a confirmation role, and evidence for (or against) careful and responsible management. Building on the earlier work of Skinner (1994) and Pownall, Wasley and Waymire (1993) , recent studies on voluntary management earnings forecasts provide additional motivation for studying the timing, relevance and information content of different types of information (see Lennox and Park, 2006; Brown and Higgins, 2005) .
In the US, there is a body of evidence which suggests that the earnings reporting process has lost some of its relevance to investors due to the availability of competing information sources (see, for example, Francis, Schipper and Vincent, 2002; Lev and Zarowin, 1999; Collins, Maydew and Weiss, 1997) . Notably, analysts are able to usefully draw upon non-financial information, taking advantage of the fact that such sources are not constrained by generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP) and are likely to have greater timeliness when compared to earnings and financial reports. Another branch of the empirical literature suggests asymmetric stock price reactions to falling short of versus beating analysts' consensus forecasts (Sequeira, Ho and Tang, 2007 , Skinner and Sloan, 2002 and Lopez and Rees, 2001 . While this evidence suggests that analysts' forecasts have significant information content, with wealth implications for management and investors, it also implicitly points to the relevance of earnings reports, which provide a yardstick for assessing whether forecasters have under or over-predicted earnings.
All of this empirical evidence suggests that the information environment for firms is dynamic and that there is a complex mutual inter-dependence between earnings forecasts and reported earnings. In this paper, our methodology addresses this interdependence by following the forecasts and actual earnings for each firm in chronological order, and exploring whether analysts' forecasts are a timely and accurate source of competing information in relation to reported earnings, and then whether reported earnings feed additional information into future forecasts. The fundamental questions that we investigate are: (i) are analysts' earnings forecasts substitutes, complements or simply a repeat of reported earnings; and (ii) is there information in reported earnings that was not anticipated in past forecasts, but which contributes to future forecasts?
Addressing these questions is important since a clear understanding of this process is useful at two levels. First, it has implications for regulators who formulate disclosure policy. A better understanding of the process of information dissemination in markets would help regulators to frame and strengthen disclosure policy for the various market participants. Such knowledge will help regulators to frame policies that govern the practices of and relationship between analysts vis-à-vis firms for which they provide the forecasts. 5 Second, understanding the earnings/forecast linkage enhances investors' ability to assess the value-add of information intermediaries such as analysts to the investment decision making process.
The results of our paper show evidence of bi-directional "causality" i.e. that analyst earnings forecasts Granger-cause reported earnings and similarly reported earnings Granger-cause earnings forecasts. In other words, analyst earnings forecasts (reported earnings) have information content separate from that in past earnings (analysts forecasts) that is helpful in predicting reported earnings (analyst earnings forecasts). Further, past earnings and past forecasts both provide information that is incorporated into future
forecasts. This provides valuable time series evidence (in contrast to prior crosssectionally based analysis) that affirms the mutual inter-dependence of earnings forecasts 5 As a recent example of regulators' interest in this general area, consider the SEC promulgation of Regulation FD -Fair Disclosure (Reg FD). Proponents of Reg FD argued that selective disclosure of information encourages analysts to provide biased recommendations in order to maintain good relations with the firm management in order to remain privy to first hand information. Thus, Reg FD was created to promote full and fair disclosure, such that any new material information released by companies to a select group e.g. analysts, must be made fully public.
and reported earnings in a dynamic information network. The findings are independent of the concerns on methodological issues in the previous literature.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents a brief literature review, while Section 3 outlines our data. In Section 4, our methodology on the non-standard Granger Causality test is presented. Section 5 outlines and discusses our results and Section 6 presents our conclusion.
Literature Review and Hypotheses

Introduction
The relationships between stock prices, earnings forecasts and reported earnings have been studied extensively by numerous researchers. Most of the literature cited in Section 1 focuses on the short run relationships between stock price reactions to reported earnings and analyst forecasts, although it is recognized that there are long run components in stock prices, earnings and their associated forecasts.
Our study builds on the premise of earlier work by Ou and Penman (1989) and Beaver, Lambert and Morse (1980) which show that the permanent component of prior earnings can provide explanatory power in predicting future earnings and stock prices.
Specifically, Ou and Penman (1989, p. 112) remark that "certain of these numbers (numbers presented in the income statement, balance sheet, and the statement of changes in financial position) can be summarized into one measure that predicts future earnings and also filters out transitory components of current earnings." (italics added).
Analysts earnings forecasts can be viewed as a sufficient summary statistic 6 that incorporate general market information, as well as the numbers in the financial statements of the firm, including past reported earnings, to predict the future earnings of the firm.
Therefore, it is not unreasonable to conclude that there exists a linkage between past earnings, current analyst forecasts and the future reported earnings. Recent research also suggests that management try to influence analyst forecasts, for example, through the strategic release of profit warnings and management forecasts (Libby, Tan and Hunton, 2006; Soffer, Thiagarajan and Walther, 2000) . Our paper launches off the preceding arguments to provide evidence on the mutual inter-dependence of the lead, lag or contemporaneous relationships between reported earnings and earnings forecasts of a firm.
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A major contribution of our paper is that it uses a lead-lag structure to model both short-run and long-run interactions between reported earnings and earnings forecasts, thereby accounting for a permanent component as well as medium and short-run interactions. This approach not only presents a formal framework to document the interactions between analyst forecasts and reported earnings, independent of stock price reactions, it also provides an alternative perspective to the findings reported in previous work such as Ali, Klein and Rosenfeld (1992, p.197) which conclude that "analysts 6 The concept of "sufficiency" that we have in mind here is analogous to the normal statistical definition of a "sufficient" statistic -that is, a sufficient statistic (analysts forecast) for θ (the reported earnings) captures all the relevant information about θ that is in the data (environment). 7 There exists a host of literature on the permanent and transitory earnings components in forecasting earnings per share (Piotroski and Roulstone, 2004; Jones, Morton and Schaefer, 2000; Baber, Kang and Kumar, 1999; Ali and Zarowin, 1992a, Ali and Zarowin, 1992b; Ali, Klein and Rosenfeld, 1992; Collins and Kothari, 1989; Ou and Penman, 1989; Kormendi and Lipe, 1987; Beaver, Lambert and Morse, 1980) . However to keep our research design manageable, we do not attempt to disentangle the permanent and transitory components.
correctly use the time-series properties of annual earnings when setting their forecasts of annual EPS".
Analysts' role as information providers for earnings determination
Various researchers such as Francis and Schipper (1999) and Lev and Zarowin (1999) environment affects the informativeness of the reports and that the informativeness of analyst research and financial statements are complementary.
Another strand of the literature on the relationship between earnings information and analyst information is the theoretical work of Kim and Verrecchia (1991 , 1994 and 1997 . The main feature of their work is the modelling and predictions of market reactions to public announcements. Notably, their models recognize and attempt to incorporate the interaction of public and private information. They identify institutions such as financial analysts and large stockholders (e.g. fund managers) who are capable of acquiring and processing information in such a way that it retains a private/confidential nature. In this setting, Kim and Verrecchia model how the quality or precision of the forthcoming public announcements affect the incentives and acquisition of private information by these institutions. Public announcements of sufficient precision, which permit traders to act profitably on the acquired private information, will further reinforce the acquisition of private information by these institutions.
In addition, the Kim and Verrecchia model predicts that as the quality of prior information increases or as the cost of information gathering increases, the incentive to acquire costly private information will decrease. If we interpret analyst reports as revealed private information, their models appear to suggest that as the quality of earnings announcements increase, then prior earnings are sufficient signals for future earnings. This sufficiency suggests that there is less incentive and a lower need for the acquisition of useful private (analyst) information. As such, it may result in analysts reports which nevertheless are produced, to simply "repeat" the information contained in public earnings announcements. Further, as the (relative) cost of information gathering decreases (inversely correlated with the size of the firm) and holding all other factors constant, their model indicates that analyst reports may become substitutes for earnings announcements.
Lang and Lundholm (1996) find that more informative corporate disclosures are positively related to the number of analyst forecasts and negatively related to analyst forecast dispersion. Lang and Lundholm (1996, p. 490) conclude that "disclosures increase the demand for analyst reports because they reduce the costs of supplying them".
They argue that their evidence might show that analysts are not directly competing with the firm's disclosures and is "consistent with the view that analysts possess both firmprovided and privately-acquired information" (p. 490). Barron, Byard and Kim (2002) also find evidence that the demand for analyst reports increases with the firms' disclosures. They argue that their findings and those of Lang and Lundholm (1996) are consistent with the fact that analysts serve as information processors and analyst reports are complements to actual earnings reports.
For many of the above-mentioned papers (and for this literature in general), a major unresolved issue is whether the same conclusions are valid if stock market reactions are not used as the basis for assessing the link between analyst reports and earnings announcements. Accordingly, we provide an alternative empirical approach that delivers such evidence -with a special focus on the issue of whether analyst reports are substitutes, complements or simply repeats of reported earnings.
Hypotheses
The main theme from the preceding literature review is that there are many competing, complementary or even substitutionary sources of information, about the future earnings of firms. Our paper focuses on a particularly important source of such information:
analyst earnings forecasts.
Our hypotheses are premised on the idea that analysts' earnings forecasts will (depending on their quality) successfully predict the next round of (scheduled) earnings numbers. In turn, we hypothesize that past (scheduled) reported earnings numbers contain information that is extremely useful to analysts, thereby having a major impact on the forecasts that they make of future earnings. Accordingly, we set up a framework which accommodates the possibility of either uni-directional or bi-directional "causality"
between reported earnings and analyst earnings forecasts. Our hypotheses are as follows:
H1: Analysts forecasts of earnings contain information (additional to that contained in past earnings) that is useful for predicting earnings (i.e.
forecasts Granger "cause" reported earnings)
H2: Prior reported earnings numbers contain information (additional to that contained in past forecasts) that is useful for future forecasts (i.e. earnings reports Granger "cause" analyst forecasts)
The first hypothesis is tested against the null that earnings forecasts do not Granger cause reported earnings, while the second is tested against the null that reported earnings do not Granger cause earnings forecasts. For a given firm, if the null is rejected in both cases, then we can conclude that there is bi-directional causality, whereas if we fail to reject the null in both cases then there is no evidence of causality in either direction. After conducting formal tests against H1 and H2, we can use the results to classify each firm into one of four categories, involving bi-directional causality, uni-directional causality (two cases) and no causality. These scenarios are summarized in Table 1 .
[ Table 1 about here]
We stress that the interpretation of (Granger) causality in this context is not literal.
Rather, it has the interpretation that is common in the forecasting literature, which simply means that if X Granger causes Y, then past values of X provide information (over and above that contained in past values of Y) that is useful for predicting Y. Causality tests are interesting in this context because they condition on a given information set (e.g. past earnings) and then ask if other information (e.g. past forecasts) improves the ability to predict a target variable (e.g. future earnings). The conditioning on one portion of the information set allows the researcher to assess the additional contribution that another portion of the information set makes towards the forecast, and this is particularly useful if one wants to follow information flows from one variable to another.
Our tests seek to examine directly the time series relationship between analysts' earnings forecasts and actual earnings announcements, in addition to simply asking whether analysts' forecasts are a credible and sufficiently accurate source of timely competing information to the reported earnings event. The key innovation in our paper is that we assess information flows between earnings and forecasts, using a careful adaptation of a widely acclaimed time series approach that does not rely on any measurement of stock market consequences. In so doing, we complement and extend the cross-sectional methodologies used in prior studies which have examined the information dynamics of earnings.
Data and Sampling Issues
Basics
There are alternative/competing sources of public information capable of providing insights into the direction and, to a certain extent, the magnitude of current year earnings.
These sources can be characterized into three broad categories: (a) firm specific; (b) industry specific; 10, 11 and (c) country or economy wide. Our direct focus in this paper will be on firm specific information and analyst forecasts specific to the firm. Firm specific information includes prior period earnings of the firm and voluntary management earnings forecasts or guidance.
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The typical US firm furnishes an earnings report that relates to each quarter t and for each of these reports, we record actual earnings per share (e t ) and the date (s t ) on which the earnings report was issued. Analysts' forecasts of earnings per share (f jtτ , for analysts j = 1,2,…,J t ), and the date τ on which analyst j issued the forecast for quarter t are also recorded. Both of these are sourced from the I/B/E/S database. Given that we wish to trace the dynamics of information flows from reported earnings to earnings forecasts (and vice-versa), we give special attention to the timing of forecasts, relative to when the relevant quarter ended and when the associated earnings report was actually issued. The average lag between the timing of the earnings report due date and when it was issued was 33.2 days. While most forecasts for any given quarter were made during that quarter, some were made prior to the beginning of the quarter in question, and many were made after the end of the quarter but before the earnings report was actually issued. As such, we characterize our sample of earnings forecasts into three mutually exclusive groups: Type 1 forecasts are forecasts which occur prior to the release of reported earnings for the previous quarter; Type 2 forecasts are forecasts that occur within the quarter in question, but post Type 1 forecasts; while Type 3 forecasts are those that come after the end of the quarter, but prior to the actual reported earnings event.
13 Figure 1 provides a pictorial representation of the three different types of forecasts.
[ Figure 1 about here] Figure 2 shows the distribution of earnings forecasts for Marsh and McClennan during the first quarter of 1985, as an illustrative example of a typical situation in our 13 The timing of Type 3 forecasts corresponds to the period designated for earnings "preannouncements" i.e. management forecasts made after the end of the reporting period, but before the release of the preliminary final earnings announcement. For examples of this literature, see Skinner (1994); Soffer, Thiagarajan and Walther (2000) ; and Skinner and Sloan (2002) . Other things being equal, Type 3 forecasts are 'information rich' as they occur in a time period in which management are most active in providing guidance to the analysts since the quarter is over and the management will have proprietary information about quarterly performance. Management may resort to preannouncements to manage the analysts so as to avoid any possible earnings disappointments (Matsumoto, 2002 Of the 19,983 firms in our original sample, there were one hundred and twenty two for which we had a continuous series of at least 60 actual reported earnings observations, and we restricted our time series analysis to these firms. Over the period of analysis, our sample firms have market capitalization ranging from US$15 million to US$596 billion dollars (Microsoft Corp). The median (average) market capitalization of the sample was US$2.9 billion (US$12.1 billion). The sample covers 35 two-digit SIC industries with no 14 Marsh and McClennan is a professional services firm providing consulting advice in the areas of risk, strategy and human capital. The firm belongs to the GICS financial services sector. 15 Type 4 forecasts can potentially incorporate all relevant information, including the announced earnings. However, since reported earnings are known, these are not valid forecasts in the normal sense of the wordthus we ignore them for the purposes of our analysis.
more than ten percent of the sample drawn from the two main industries, Electronic and other electrical equipment and components, except computer equipment (SIC 36) and Electric, gas, and sanitary services (SIC 49).
Summary details of the reported earnings and associated forecasts for these firms are displayed in Table 2 . Our final sample contains 9,078 observations and 126,202
forecasts. Most (80.1%) of these forecasts are of the Type 2 variety -they are issued after the last earnings announcement, but before the end of the current reporting quarter. An additional 17.4% are of the Type 3 variety -they are forecasts issued after the quarter has ended but before the earnings report is actually made public.
[ Table 2 about here]
Are analyst forecasts unbiased?
The lower half of Table 2 
As above, the brackets contain HAC t-statistics. In this case, the null hypothesis that the three forecast types are equally as accurate is soundly rejected. The null hypothesis that forecasts are jointly unbiased is soundly rejected, as are the null hypotheses that the Type 1 and Type 2 forecasts are unbiased. However, the data accepts the restriction that the Type 3 forecasts are unbiased, with the p-value for the relevant test being 0.1775. 
Organising the analyst forecasts
The broad research questions of interest are whether analysts' earnings forecasts represent useful substitutes or complements to actual reported earnings, and what sort of lead-lag structures characterize the relationship between the earnings forecasts and the reported earnings. In particular we are interested in whether there is information in the earnings forecasts (reported earnings) that is useful for predicting reported earnings (earnings 16 We address the issue of how the presence of unit roots might affect inference when we present time series regressions of earnings on forecasts. 17 Details are not reported to conserve space.
forecasts), and whether the earnings forecasts (reported earnings) contain information that is not contained in past reported earnings (earnings forecasts). A time series technique
often used to address issues such as these is the Granger causality test. However, this test is typically based on regularly observed data, with each series being observed (just once) during each time period. In the current setting however, we have to deal with the fact that there may be many forecasts for each earnings observation, and that forecasts and earnings are not observed contemporaneously.
We appeal to the forecast combination literature to address the first of these issues (see Timmermann, 2006) , and work with "combined" or consensus forecasts for each quarter. There are many ways of combining forecasts and while there is an ongoing debate regarding which combinations are optimal, it is widely recognized that arithmetic averages work well in many situations. Indeed, arithmetic averages are often superior (in terms of root mean squared error) to trimmed averages or averages that have been weighted according to criteria such as the relative timing of forecasts. This leads us to choose unweighted forecast averages for each quarter as our representative measure.
However, we do allow for the forecast timing considerations alluded to above by considering three forecast combinations. First, using 2t d as an indicator taking a value of unity when f jtτ is a Type 2 forecast and zero otherwise, we focus on 2t f defined below, as our primary forecast variable:
This forecast metric takes the arithmetic average of Type 2 forecasts, across analysts for a given firm, in a specific quarter. Type 2 forecasts are "standard" forecasts, in the sense that while they might incorporate past earnings information, they do not incorporate any information that becomes available after the end of the reporting period.
Alternatively, we also calculate: Figure 3 compares the three forecast combinations for an illustrative sample firm, Eli Lilly. 19 We find that there is very little difference between them, and since the naked eye cannot differentiate them from each other when they are plotted in the same graph, we have added constants to each of f12 and f123 to illustrate their co-movement. Figure 4 compares the combination f2 forecast with the reported earnings series for the same illustrative firm. The forecasts track the reported earnings quite closely, although not surprisingly they fail to capture the sharp decline in earnings in 1987:4. In this case we can attribute the forecast error to analysts' inability to anticipate the corporate earnings 18 We did not calculate forecast averages for Type 1 or Type 3 forecasts alone because on several occasions the set of forecasts relating to any given reported earnings observation did not include any of these types of forecasts. 19 Eli Lilly, established in the 1870s, is a leading producer of prescription drugs. Accordingly, it belongs to the Healthcare GICS sector, and is classified in the pharmaceuticals sub-industry.
impact of the 1987 stock market crash. Such 'failures' were observed for several (but not all) firms for this quarter, and similarly large forecast errors were observed once or twice at other times across most of the sample.
[ Figures 3 and 4 about here] Table 3 reports the time series properties of earnings and forecast combinations. It
shows that for most of the 122 firms in our sample, there is a quarterly seasonality in the data series and evidence of a trend. Much of this trend is likely to be drift associated with a unit root process in earnings, because the unit root tests reported in column 7 reject the null of a unit root in only twenty two cases. Data that contains a unit root with drift is "non-stationary" in the sense that even if it is de-trended, the de-trended data fails to be mean reverting, so that the series "wanders" rather than returns to trend. The variance is also non-constant, growing with the sample size. These properties can imply that standard t and F tests statistics do not have the usual t and F distributions, so that care is needed when attempting to draw inferences based on the usual types of tests. We deal with this problem in the formal analysis that follows. The properties of the forecasts mirror those for earnings, although there are differences between the incidence of outliers in the earnings series and the incidence of outlying forecasts.
[ Table 3 about here] Table 4 provides some preliminary analysis of the relationship between reported earnings and earnings forecast combinations. The usual tests of "good forecasting" are provided in column 3 and 4, although it needs to be noted that the time series behavior of our raw data is likely to invalidate many of these tests. Nevertheless, if we treat these test results as "indicative", then we find evidence against the assertion that e t = f t + a zero mean prediction error, for about thirty out of the 122 firms. Given that earnings and forecasts appear to contain unit roots, an appropriate way to analyse the relationship between them is to consider whether they are cointegrated. Series with unit roots are often called integrated series in the time series literature, and two integrated series are cointegrated if they move together in the long run, even though each series tends to "wander" when considered individually. The idea that there might be a close long-run relation between earning and forecasts is intuitively appealing, and it is actually expected in a forecasting context. 20 In column 5, tests of no cointegration support cointegration in most cases, and if we force the cointegrating vector to reflect a one-to-one relationship between earnings and forecasts, then the tests (in column 6) broadly support this restriction.
21
[ Table 4 about here]
Tests of Granger Causality -Modified to Account for Irregular Observations
Standard Granger causality tests
Given two series x t and y t , standard Granger Causality tests (Granger, 1969) are based on the bivariate system given by: Campbell and Shiller (1988) discuss this issue in the context of forecasting dividends. This is also consistent with the notion that analysts have the ability to forecast the permanent component of earnings of a firm relatively accurately. 21 Formally, the tests are performed using the augmented Dickey-Fuller (1979) The latter problem can be circumvented by using an approach outlined in Toda and Yamamoto (1995) or by considering an error correction approach. Toda and Yamamoto's procedure simply adds an extra lag onto (5), but conducts the tests on lags 1 -p. Standard t and F tests are valid once the extra lag has been included in the test regression. The second and more common approach is based on the well known error correction reparameterization of (5) given by: (6), π x measures the long-run impact of y t on x t , and π y (=1/π x ) measures the long-run impact of x t on y t . If x t and y t are cointegrated then a cointegrating relationship is given by x t = π x y t and at least one of λ x or λ y will be non-zero, but (6) is a valid representation of (5) even if x t and y t are not cointegrated.
Tests based on the equations in (6) are well behaved because the variables in these equations are typically stationary. Exceptions occur when there is no long-run relationship between x t and y t , so that x t-1 -π x y t-1 is non-stationary. In this case OLS will force x λˆ and y λˆto zero so as to minimize the sum of squared residuals, but the remaining parameter estimates are well behaved.
Three types of Granger causality tests are typically considered in this framework:
(i) a test of long-run Granger causality (LRC); (ii) a test of short-run Granger causality (SRC) and (iii) an overall test of Granger causality (GC). Considering tests that y t does not Granger cause x t , the long-run test is a (t or F) test of H₀: λ x = 0; the short-run test is a test (F-test) of H₀: all β j * = 0, and the overall test is a joint test of both of these hypotheses. The mirror images of these tests apply for the converse case of the null that x t does not Granger cause y t .
Modified Granger causality tests
Our time series for reported earnings and their forecasts do not fully conform with the above framework, because our forecasts f t are measured before the earnings e t are observed. Further, we are interested in whether {f t , f t-1 , f t-2 , …f 1 } contains information about e t , over and above the information in {e t-1 , e t-2 , …e 1 }, whereas a standard Granger causality analysis asks whether { f t-1 , f t-2 , …f 1 } contains information about e t , over and above the information in {e t-1 , e t-2 , …e 1 }. That is, in our framework f t is validly included as part of the information set for t e , whereas it would not be included in conventional settings. We are also interested in whether the history of earnings provides information (not in past forecasts) that feeds into current forecasts, i.e. whether {e t-1 , e t-2 , …e 1 } contributes to forecasts f t , given that {f t-1 , f t-2 , …f 1 } is known. This leads us to consider the system specified by: 
where we have normalized the error correction terms on e t (and rescaled λ f accordingly).
Tests of whether earnings forecasts lead reported earnings in the long run are based on λ e , tests of whether forecasts lead earnings in the short run are based on the β j * , and overall tests of whether forecasts lead earnings are joint tests on λ e and β j * . Similarly, tests of whether past reported earnings provide information about current forecasts that is not contained in past forecasts, are tests relating to * f λ and/or γ j * .
We call our tests Granger causality tests, but emphasize that they have a subtly different format and interpretation than standard Granger causality tests. In our empirical implementation, we choose the lag length p by applying AIC to the joint system defined in (7). AIC is useful in this context, because it tends to choose long lag lengths, which then increases the likelihood that our models incorporate all relevant dynamics (that are needed for forecasting) and reduces the possibility of serial correlation in the residuals.
We augment our chosen lag length for (7) by one lag so that we can use the Toda and Yamamoto (1995) results and have confidence in our inferences. We also include quarterly dummies in (7) and (8) to account for the seasonality reported in Table 3 , and we include a time trend in (7) to account for possible drift. When estimating the equations in (8) we use a two-stage approach in which we first estimate the "error correction term" or deviation from the long term relationship (i.e. z t = e t -π x f t ), and then use the implied z t-1 and single equation OLS to estimate our "causality" coefficients. We experiment with two estimates of z t ; the first (z t 1 ) works with the residuals obtained by running a regression of e t on f t (and a constant), while the second is the "theoretical deviation", defined by z t 2 = e t -f t . We base all of our causality analysis on HAC corrected F-tests.
Empirical Results
Table 5 presents summary information relating to our estimates of the equations in (7) for each of the 122 firms. Reported regressions are based on: (a) Type 2 forecasts (i.e. we set
forecasts in which f t = f23 t ; and (d) all types of forecasts in which f t = f123 t . All test statistics are based on Toda and Yamamoto's approach so that inference is valid despite possible non-stationarity, and they are also corrected for residual heteroskedasticity and serial correlation.
The first thing to note is that the estimated equations fit the data very well, with the average R² measures being around 90%. In columns 3 and 5 we present the results of "Granger causality" tests based on the β and γ coefficients, to provide an indication of the causality structure in the data. The reported counts suggest that past forecasts are useful for predicting current earnings in all but seventeen (three) firms for Type 2 forecasts (all types of forecasts). Here, the tests are conditioned on past earnings, so that the Granger causality indicates that past forecasts are providing additional information on future earnings to that contained in past earnings. There are not pronounced differences between the results found for different types of forecasts, but it seems that the later the forecasts, the more likely they are to be useful for predicting earnings. Column 5 indicates that analysts often incorporate information from past earnings into their forecasts, even after using information contained in past forecasts. Indeed, for Type 2 (Type 1 & 2) forecasts, there are only twenty nine (twenty eight) cases in which analysts do not seem to be using information on past earnings when forming their forecasts. By comparison, for all types of forecasts, the number of cases in which analysts do not seem to be using information on past earnings has grown to thirty five.
Details on the chosen lag structure for these models are not reported, but our results
show that although the persistence in earnings and forecasts varies quite widely from firm to firm, it is generally long-lived. Past information takes three years (12 quarters) to be fully reflected in current data in more than one third of our firms. This is particularly noteworthy given that the previous accounting literature has found or assumed much shorter persistence in earnings, but it is quite consistent with Ou and Penmen's (1989) notion of a permanent component in earnings. Indeed, this finding of a long-lived persistence in earnings/forecasts is a major contribution of our paper as most studies only provide an understanding of the lead-lag relationship between reported earnings and stock prices (Ou and Penman; 1989 and Beaver, Lambert and Morse; 1980) .
22
[ Table 5 about here] Tables 6 and 7 present details relating to estimated versions of the re-parameterized system (8). In both tables, each of the two error correction models lead to very similar outcomes and it is noteworthy that the overall tests of no Granger causality in Tables 6   and 7 are also similar to those in Table 5 . For the first differences in reported earnings equations in Table 6 , the results for the estimated error correction term suggest a long-run effect of Type 2 (all types) forecasts in fifty eight (sixty nine) cases. 23 The estimated λ e coefficient while not reported, is usually negative for every firm. From this we can infer that on average, changes in reported earnings will fall when previous forecasts were too low (e t-1 -f t-1 >0) and they will rise (on average) when past forecasts were too high. First differences in earnings forecasts also have short-run predictive power for quarterly changes in reported earnings. For Type 2 (all types) forecasts, the results suggest a shortrun effect for one hundred and eight (one hundred and twenty) cases. The error correction models that impose unbiased forecasts lead to slightly stronger results, finding more evidence of causality than in the unrestricted case.
[ Tables 6 and 7 about here] 22 See Nichols and Wahlen (2004) for a review of the accounting research on the relationship between earnings numbers and stock returns. 23 We find similar results for the case in which there is imposed error correction term.
For the quarterly changes in earnings forecasts shown in Table 7 , we see less evidence of both long and short-run causality, although it is still clear that past earnings generally contain information that appears to influence forecasts. Announcements appear to contain useful long-run information about forecasts. As was the case for Table 6 , the results of the imposed error correction term set-up are generally stronger than the counterpart estimated error correction term results. For example, in the imposed situation with Type 2 forecasts, there is a long-run causality effect in fifty four cases, compared to thirty seven when the error correction term is estimated (Table 7 , columns (3) and (7)).
For cases when the estimated * f λ is statistically significant, it is generally positive, reflecting future upward adjustment of forecasts when past earnings were higher than predicted (e t-1 -f t-1 >0).
Finally, the results of short-run causality are stronger than for the long run. For example, an examination of the imposed error correction term results show that for seventy two cases for the Type 2 forecasts there is evidence of short-run causality, whereas only fifty four counterpart cases of long-run causality are found (Table 7, columns (7) and (8)). This suggests that analysts often find recent past earnings reports useful when forming their forecasts, but they are less likely to find the entire history of past earnings useful when forming these forecasts. This is a central finding in our paper as it is the first time substantial empirical evidence is provided to support this intuitive conclusion in a time series framework. Tables 8 and 9 provide an overview of the results of the tests. Using the framework outlined in Table 1 (Categories C1 to C4), generally, these tables show that there is bidirectional causality (C1) for about 75% of firms (using both the estimated and implied error correction terms). Most of this causality is of the short-run variety ( [ Tables 8 and 9 about here] Two important observations are gleaned from Tables 8 and 9 . First, cases of bidirectional and uni-directional Granger causality are much more prevalent in the shortrun as compared to the long-run. Second, it is heartening to observe that earnings forecasts Granger cause reported earnings in considerably more cases than reported earnings Granger cause forecast earnings. This clearly shows the important role played by earnings forecasts in capturing the information content of reported earnings and, hence, the important role played by analysts in providing information to the market about the reported earnings of firms.
Conclusion
We conduct suitably adapted Granger causality tests to study information flows between analyst earnings forecasts and reported earnings. This time-series methodology complements the standard cross-sectional techniques that are often based on stock market reactions to the arrival of news, by enabling analysis on the lead-lag structure of the information content in forecasts and reports. We reconfirm previous evidence of a positive bias in forecasts, but also find that this evidence becomes weaker as the forecast horizon becomes shorter. Further, we find that the lag structure in information flows is longer (up to twelve quarters) than has been assumed in previous literature.
Our Granger causality tests find that analysts' earnings forecasts Granger-cause reported earnings in the short run for nearly all firms. Furthermore, analysts earnings forecasts Granger-cause reported earnings in the long run for about half of all firms. This provides time series evidence that forecasts are useful for predicting future earnings despite forecast bias. In both cases, the Granger causality implies that the forecasts contain information over and above that which is contained in past earnings alone.
We also find that earnings Granger-cause forecasts for about two thirds of the firms in the short run and for about one third of the firms in the long run. Taken together, our test results demonstrate that there is pervasive bi-directional causality, even though we document stronger forecast to reporting earnings Granger causality than causality in the reverse direction. However, this latter type of causality is particularly interesting, because it implies that future forecasts are not simply based on previous forecasts; they rely on additional information contained in earnings reports as well. Thus we conclude that forecasts do not (fully) substitute for the reported earnings figures, but rather, they complement the information contained in reported earnings.
Our time series approach offers a new perspective on how analyst forecasts and earnings reports contribute to the information set on a firm's performance, because it explicitly accounts for the timing of information events. Further, our approach allows for (non constant) firm specific differences in behavior, since we have not averaged across different firms (as in standard cross-sectional analysis, or in standard analyses of panels).
Our summary results show that the causality results differ across firms especially in the long-run, and especially when one considers the impact of past earnings reports on forecasts. Our future research will focus on the determination of firm and analyst characteristics that have an influence on whether earnings do (or do not) Granger cause forecasts (and whether forecasts do, or do not Granger cause earnings). The symbols *** and * signify statistically significant at the 1% and 10% levels respectively. The quantity (s − τ ) measures the time between when the earnings forecast (f) was made and when the reported earnings (e) was issued. HAC standard errors are corrected for heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation. Forecasts (f) are separated into three types according to their timing relative to the quarter to which they relate. Type 1 forecasts occur prior to the release of reported earnings for the previous quarter; Type 2 forecasts occur during the quarter, but post Type 1 forecasts; and Type 3 forecasts occur after the end of the 'target' quarter but before the reporting date of the earnings. Table 2 for a description of the forecast types. The information reported in this table relate to a sample of 122 firms. Lag lengths p were chosen using AIC for each bivariate system and then augmented by one. The earnings and forecasting equations are specified in equation (7) in the text, but they include quarterly dummies and a time trend as well. H 0 : f does not Granger Cause e implies that all β j = 0 (except for the augmented lag) and H 0 : e does not Granger Cause f implies that all γ j = 0 (except for the augmented lag). All test statistics have been calculated using HAC consistent covariances. See Table 2 for a description of the forecast types. 
